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A. Introduction 
 
Countries undergoing a transitional process face multiple problems and 
challenges. The process of transformation from a dictatorial, anti-democratic or 
authoritarian state into a constitutional democracy which respects the rule of law 
and the fundamental human rights of its citizens is a difficult and strenuous one. 
Often equipped with only limited financial resources, many newly elected, 
democratic governments find themselves confronted with a variety of urgent 
problems waiting to be resolved: the civil service and the judiciary need to be 
restructured or reformed, jobs must be created for the hundreds of thousands of 
unemployed, the economy must be put back on the right track and the poor have to 
be provided with housing, food and health care. While the extent and nature of 
these and other challenges naturally vary considerably, depending on the 
circumstances and the specific situation of the state concerned, there is one issue 
which has to be faced almost inevitable by every transitional society: the question 
of how to deal with its own troubled past.  
 
Broadly speaking, there are three different approaches for dealing with a 
burdensome past. Firstly, there is the option to move on, to focus on the future and 
simply to forget the conflicts of the past. This option is generally characterised by 
a general amnesty for the perpetrators of the old regime, shielding those who 
committed atrocities and gross violations of human rights from any criminal 
prosecutions. Spain is probably the most prominent example for a country having 
chosen this way but amnesty laws have also been passed, inter alia, in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Uruguay.1  
 
Secondly, there is the option to prosecute and punish gross human rights 
offenders and to hold accountable the members of the old regime. In Greece for 
instance, 18 Generals were convicted for high treason only months after the end of 
their military dictatorship.2 Ethiopia is another example for a country having opted 
for this approach while Rwanda has decided to reappraise its gruesome past by a 
combination of international and national criminal prosecutions.3   
 
Finally, there is the option to employ alternative mechanisms and 
procedures like truth commissions and other non-penal measures.4 This is, so to 
speak, the middle course between the two extremes of general amnesties and 
criminal prosecutions. Numerous truth commissions have been set up so far in 
                                                
1
 Florian Kutz Amnestie für politische Straftäter in Südafrika (1999) 9-10.   
2
 Ibid 6. 
3
 Ibid 6-7. 
4
 Vetting programmes to remove certain categories of office-holders from certain public or private 
offices have been primarily implemented in a number of Eastern European countries. See eg 
Herman Schwartz ‘Lustration in Eastern Europe’ in Neil Kritz (ed) Transitional justice - how 
emerging democracies reckon with former regimes vol 1 (1995) 461.  
countries as different as Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Timor-Leste, Morocco, 
Sierra Leone or South Africa, just to mention the most prominent examples. As 
divergent as these commissions in each of these different countries might have 
been, they all were established to investigate and verify past human rights 
violations, to give victims of grave human rights abuses a forum to tell their 
stories and to acknowledge officially what happened during certain dark and 
painful periods in their respective countries’ histories.5 This option tries to strike a 
balance between the need to reappraise a country’s past on the one hand and the 
necessity to preserve its still young and vulnerable democracy on the other.  
 
While the first two of these options focus predominantly on the role of the 
perpetrator, the final option is traditionally rather a victim-centred approach.6 This 
is of particular importance since it is the victims whose rights and needs are 
usually  the first to be forgotten in a  transitional period. However, most  countries  
                                                
5
 For a comprehensive overview of the earlier established truth commissions see Priscilla B Hayner 
‘Fifteen truth commissions - 1974 to 1994: a comparative study’ (1994) 16 Human Rights 
Quarterly 597. 
6
 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was the first commission with the 
authority to grant amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights violations.  
choose to combine elements of the different options by eg granting amnesty only 
for the less serious crimes while prosecuting the more serious offences7 or by 
granting a general amnesty on the one hand while simultaneously establishing a 
truth commission on the other.8   
 
Which way a country finally chooses to go often depends on institutional 
and political constraints. In many cases it is a purely political decision, ie a mere 
question of power. However, transitional countries do not operate in a legal 
vacuum but are subject to international law as every other state, which imposes 
certain limitations and restraints on transitional countries’ choices of how to come 
to terms with their past. These limitations revolve primarily around two major 
points: on the one hand states’ obligation to prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations and on the other hand states’ duty to provide 
compensation for the victims of these offences. 
 
South Africa chose not to prosecute its Apartheid criminals but also 
refused to grant a general, unconditional amnesty for the numerous crimes 
committed during the many years of conflict. Instead it opted for the establishment 
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a rather unique mandate. 
While the ability of the Commission to recommend reparation measures for 
victims of gross human rights abuses is still comparable with the competences of 
other truth commissions, its power to grant amnesty under certain, specifically 
defined conditions was at the time rather revolutionary. It is this power which 
differentiates the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission from every 
previously established commission and makes it a model for future transitional 
processes. But it is also this power which has attracted the most criticism and has 
raised doubts, whether the South African transitional process was in compliance 
with international law.9        
This thesis will explore and examine the different obligations and 
constraints international law imposes on countries in transition with regard to the 
question of criminal prosecutions and compensation, and apply the findings to the 
South African context. Following this introduction, it will provide a short 
overview of the South African transitional process, the creation of the TRC, its 
mandate and objectives and its specific provisions regarding the question of 
amnesty and victims compensation (B). Subsequently it will be determined 
whether international law - international treaties as well as customary international 
law - requires states to prosecute gross human rights offenders criminally (C) and / 
or to provide compensation for their victims (D). Given the importance and 
significance of the transitional process of South Africa in general and the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in particular as a potential model 
for transitional processes and truth commissions in other transitional contexts, it 
will finally be determined whether this model was in compliance with South 
Africa’s international legal obligations (E).  
                                                
7
 Like in the cases of Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. See eg Suzannah Linton ‘Cambodia, East 
Timor and Sierra Leone: experiments in international justice’ (2001) 12 Crim L Forum 185 at 219, 
224, 231-232. 
8
 This way was chosen, inter alia, by Chile, Uruguay and El Salvador. See eg Kutz (note 1) 16.   
9
 John Dugard ‘Is the truth and reconciliation process compatible with international law? An 
unanswered question’ (1997) 13 S Afr J on Hum Rts 258 at 260. 
 B. The South African Transitional Process 
I. Background 
 
Huyse10suggests the existence of three different types of transitions - 
overthrow, reform and compromise. While the former type of transition could be 
observed in eg Argentina or Iran, where the forces of the opposition were strong 
and ultimately managed to topple the old order, in states like eg Hungary, Chile or 
Spain where the opposition was rather weak, governments finally undertook 
fundamental reforms by their own initiative. However in South Africa, the 
opposition and the national government were somewhat equally matched and thus 
unable to make the transition to democracy without each other.11 The South 
African path to democracy was hence a process of compromise, negotiated by the 
two  major  political forces of the time,  the African National Congress  (ANC)  on  
                                                
10
 Luc Huyse ‘Justice after transitions: on the choices successor elites make in dealing with the 
past’ in Kritz (note 4) 104 at 113. 
11
 Jeremy Sarkin ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’ (1997) 23 Commw L 
Bull 528 at 528. 
the one hand, and the National Party (NP) ie the South African government on the 
other. Under these circumstances, any radical or extreme approaches would have 
been ruled out from the beginning.     
 
 The question of how to deal with the past and in particular whether to grant 
amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights violations of the Apartheid state 
was one of the most difficult issues the negotiating parties had to resolve. In a 
speech, delivered at a conference in Cape Town in June 1995, Dullah Omar, then 
Minister of Justice, confirmed the view of many South Africans that had an 
amnesty process not been agreed to, an agreement between the two parties on the 
process of transformation would not have been possible.12 While the NP insisted 
on a general, unconditional amnesty, a majority in the ANC rejected this 
demand.13 A compromise was finally reached on 22 November 1993 when 
representatives of the government and the ANC drafted a postscript to the draft 
interim Constitution on the subject of amnesty.14 This postscript, generally termed 
the ‘postamble’, stresses the ‘need for understanding but not for vengeance, (...) 
for reparation but not retaliation, (...) for Ubuntu but not for victimisation’. 
Continuing, it states that   
 
 ‘[i]n order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in 
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the 
course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law 
determining a firm cut-off date (...) and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, 
including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law 
has been passed’. 
 
 It is on the basis of this postamble that the South African Parliament in 
1995 enacted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (PNURA) 
which gives effect to the postamble’s promise of amnesty, yet only under certain 
conditions. The Act is the foundation of the South African truth and reconciliation  
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 Dullah Omar in his opening address at the conference ‘Justice in Transition’ in Cape Town on 30 
June 1995. Cited after Sarkin (note 11) at 529.  
13
 Kutz (note 1) 85. See also Dugard (note 9) at 258.  
14
 Kutz (note 1) 85. 
process. It establishes the TRC and defines the details of the Commission’s 
mandate, functions and powers. However, what makes it unique is that it 
incorporates the amnesty process into the truth commission process which was at 
the time a ground breaking experiment. This link between amnesty and truth 
became  the distinctive feature of the South African TRC.       
 
II. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
 The process of establishment of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was characterised by a sense of transparency and 
openness. Right from the beginning it was decided to involve as many players as 
possible and numerous individuals and NGOs took advantage of this policy by 
submitting their proposals, recommendations and suggestions to the responsible 
authorities.15 After months of public debate, academic discussions, parliamentary 
hearings and conferences, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
establishing the TRC was finally signed into law by then President Nelson 
Mandela on 19 July 1995.16 
 
 What followed was an equally open and transparent process for selecting 
the Commissioners. A specially appointed committee was tasked to short-list out 
of 299 nominations, 25 suitable candidates whose names were then presented to 
President Mandela and his Cabinet for final consideration. Mandela eventually 
selected 15 of those 25, added two new names and appointed Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu as the chairperson of the Commission.17 After this was officially 
gazetted, the Commission held its first meeting at Archbishops Tutu’s residence at 
Bishopscourt on 16 December 1995.18 
 
During the process of its creation, three major controversies arose in 
relation to the Commission’s mandate and  functions. First, NGOs raised concerns 
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 Alex Boraine A country unmasked (2000) 47. 
16
 Sarkin (note 11) at 530. 
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 Boraine (note 15) 72-73. For a complete list of all 17 Commissioners see Sarkin (note 11) at 
531.  
18
 Boraine (note 15) 73. 
about the initial proposal that the Commission’s hearings should be held behind 
closed doors.19 Many felt that the Commission could serve its purpose much better 
if its hearings were open to the public. It was eventually agreed that the 
Commission’s hearings would be open in general but that in camera proceedings 
could be held where this was ‘in the interest of justice’.20     
 
A second bone of contention was the cut-off date for acts which were 
eligible for amnesty.21 Some22 called for an extension of the cut-off date from 5 
December 1993 to the date of President Mandela’s inauguration on 10 May 1994 
in order to include acts of pre-election violence into the amnesty process. While 
this demand was initially rejected, it was eventually agreed to by President Nelson 
Mandela at the end of 1996 and given effect by an amendment of the Constitution 
on 29 August 1997.23   
 
Finally, there was an argument about the criteria for acts associated with a 
political objective as enumerated in section 20 (3) PNURA.24 Since only acts 
which met these criteria were eligible for amnesty, this issue was one of 
considerable importance. The most controversial criterion was probably the 
requirement of proportionality between the act and its political objective. 
However, despite fierce opposition, the criterion of proportionality eventually 
remained in the final bill.25  
 
1. Mandate and Objectives of the Commission 
 
 The objectives of the TRC are defined in section 3 (1) PNURA. 
Accordingly, the Commission’s primary aim is ‘to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past’. In order to achieve this goal, the Commission must   
 
• ‘(a) [establish] as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross 
violations of human rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to [10 
May 1994] (...);  
• (b) [facilitate] the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant 
facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and comply with the requirements of 
[the PNURA]; 
• (c) (...) [restore] the human and civil dignity of (...) victims by granting them an opportunity to 
relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are the victims, and by recommending 
reparation measures in respect of them; 
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 Sarkin (note 11) at 530. 
20
 PNURA 34 of 1995 s 33 (1) (a) and (b). 
21
 Sarkin (note 11) at 530. See also Kutz (note 1) 144-149. 
22
 Especially representatives of the Freedom Front and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. See 
Kutz (note 1) 146. 
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 Ibid 146-147. 
24
 Sarkin (note 11) at 530. 
25
 Ibid.  
• (d) [compile] a report providing as comprehensive an account as possible of the activities and 
findings of the Commission (...) which contains recommendations of measures to prevent (...) 
future violations of human rights’.26 
 
Whereas the Commission’s mandate ratione temporis is relatively wide 
and covers a period of more than 30 years, its mandate ratione materiae is 
narrowed down to only gross violations of human rights which are defined by the 
Act as any ‘killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person or any 
attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit 
[any of these acts] (...)’.27 While this definition covers the most outrageous crimes 
and transgressions, it excludes many other Apartheid related injustices like the 
detention without trial of ten thousands of people or the forcible removal of 
roughly 15.5 million people from their homes and property.28 This illustrates the 
Commission’s limited competence with regard to an inquiry in the system of 
Apartheid as such and regarding acts which were legally authorised under the 
Apartheid order. As Dugard points out ‘[t]here [was] no attempt to bring within 
the ambit of the (...) enquiry acts that constituted a crime under international law 
but were not criminal under the law of Apartheid’.29 
 
The lifespan of the Commission was initially restricted to only 18 months. 
However, section 43 (1) PNURA provides for the possibility of an extension for 
another half a year. President Nelson Mandela made use of this possibility and 
extended the Commission’s mandate until 14 December 1997.30 Following an 
amendment of the PNURA, the Commission’s lifespan was again extended until 
31 July 1998.31 Eventually, in accordance with section 43 (2) of the Act, the 
Commission’s final report was presented to President Mandela on 29 October 
1998.32 
 
2. The Functioning of the Commission 
 
 The PNURA subdivides the TRC into three separate committees: the 
Committee on Human Rights Violations, the Committee on Amnesty and the 
Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation. 
 
a. The Committee on Human Rights Violations33 
 
The Committee on Human Rights Violations can be described as the heart 
of the TRC. Made up of 10 Commissioners and 10 external members, its main 
responsibility consisted of instituting inquiries, gathering information and 
evidences and recording allegations and complaints of gross human rights 
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 PNURA 34 of 1995 s 3 (1). 
27
 PNURA 34 of 1995 s 1 (1) (ix) (a) and (b).  
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 Sarkin (note 11) at 532 Fn 24. 
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 Dugard (note 9) at 260. 
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 Kutz (note 1) 91. 
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 Ibid.   
32
 Ibid 92. 
33
 PNURA 34 of 1995 ss 12-15. 
violations.34 The Committee received a good deal of its information directly from 
the people who were encouraged by the media to come forward and to report on 
their experiences and sufferings during the time of Apartheid. In total, the 
Committee received some 20 000 statements which later formed the basis for the 
Commission’s final report.35 
 
The centrepiece of the Committee’s work was its public victim hearings 
programme, which commenced, under the watchful eyes of the international 
media, on 15 April 1996 in the city of East London. These hearings gave victims 
the possibility to ‘tell their story, express their sufferings and be recognised as 
victims per se’.36 More than 70 hearings - including theme and institutional 
hearings - were held during the lifespan of the Committee, giving some 2000 
victims the chance to appear before the Committee in person.37  
 
b. The Committee on Amnesty38 
 
 The Committee on Amnesty was the most controversial body of the TRC. 
Chaired by a high-ranking judge and staffed with up to 18 additional members,39 
its main task was to consider and to decide upon thousands of applications for 
amnesty for crimes and offences committed during the conflicts of the past. Many 
of these applications were filed by members of the security forces but some also 
came from members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC, and 
other liberation movements.40 The cut-off date for applications was originally 15 
December 1996 but was later extended to 10 May 1997.41  
 
 Section 20 (1) PNURA sets three essential requirements for amnesty to be 
granted. Firstly, the application must be in compliance with the requirements of 
the PNURA. Secondly, ‘the act, omission or offence to which the application 
relates’ must have been ‘associated with a political objective [and] committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past’. Finally, the applicant must have ‘made a 
full disclosure of all relevant facts’. Whether a particular act, omission or offence 
was indeed associated with a political objective had to be decided by the 
Committee with reference to the criteria enumerated in subsection (3). The 
motives of the perpetrator, the context in which the crime took place, its legal and 
factual nature, its object or objectives, the fact, whether it was committed in the 
execution of an order as well as the relationship between the act, omission or 
offence and the political objective pursued, had thereby to be taken into account. 
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 Kutz (note 1) 96. 
In contrast, acts committed out of personal malice, ill-will or spite or for the sake 
of personal gain were not eligible for amnesty.  
 
 The Committee could generally reach its decisions on the basis of written 
proceedings but was legally required to conduct a public hearing in cases of 
serious violations of human rights.42 The decisions of the Committee had to be 
taken by majority.43 If the Committee was satisfied that the aforementioned 
requirements were fulfilled, it granted amnesty in accordance with section 20 (1) 
PNURA. If it was however convinced that the requirements of the PNURA were 
not met, it refused the application in accordance with section 21 PNURA.     
 
In any case, the decisions of the Committee had drastic and far-reaching 
consequences. In the event of a positive decision, applicants were exempted from 
any criminal or civil liability in respect of the amnestied crimes, as were the 
bodies or organisations which might have stood behind them. This follows from 
section 20 (7) (a) PNURA which states that  
 
‘[n]o person who has been granted amnesty in respect of an act, omission or offence shall 
be criminally or civilly liable in respect of such act, omission or offence and no body or 
organisation or the State shall be liable, and no person shall be vicariously liable, for any such act, 
omission or offence’. 
 
In contrast, if the application was refused, applicants’ liability remained 
untouched. However, since section 31 (3) PNURA forbids the admissibility of 
‘[a]ny incriminating answer or information obtained (...) from a questioning [by 
the Commission] as evidence against the person concerned in criminal 
proceedings in a court of law or before any body or institution established by or 
under any law’, those who had their application declined did not have to fear any 
adverse consequences resulting from their request.   
 
Overall, the Committee granted amnesty to a total of 1160 people from 
7094 applications.44 
 
c. The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation45 
 
Made up of five Commissioners and four external members, the 
Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee’s main responsibility was to make 
recommendations as to appropriate measures of reparation to victims of the 
conflicts of the past.46 In order to determine victims’ needs and expectations, the 
Committee collected information and propositions from a variety of different 
sources, such as NGOs or academic institutions, and held consultative workshops 
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throughout the country.47 The hearings of the Committee on Human Rights 
Violations which the Committee analysed thoroughly, supplied further 
information. However, victims were also able to address the Committee directly 
and to apply for reparation to be paid.48      
 
 In pursuance of its mandate and task, the Committee proposed a variety of 
reparation measures, ranging from the payment of monetary compensation to the 
building of monuments or the renaming of places and streets. Acting on the basis 
of the Committee’s propositions, the TRC in its final report49 ultimately 
recommended five categories of reparation to be implemented by the government:  
 
• Urgent interim reparations to assist people with urgent needs.50 
• Community rehabilitation programmes like the resettlement of displaced persons to encourage 
the healing of communities.  
• Symbolic reparations like the expunging of criminal records to restore victims’ and survivors’ 
dignity. 
• Institutional reforms to ensure that the crimes and violations of the past will not reoccur in 
future.        
• Individual reparation grants to acknowledge individual victims’ suffering.51   
 
However, since the Commission’s recommendations were of a non-
binding character only, it remained in the discretion of the government whether 
and how it would implement the Commission’s propositions. Although there was 
some early progress on many of the non-pecuniary measures, the pay out of the 
individual reparation grants was delayed for years. Only on 15 April 2003 
President Thabo Mbeki announced a once-off reparation grant of 30 000 ZAR to 
each of the approximately 22 000 recognised victims52 - much less than the 
Commission had recommended. As of November 2004 some 400 million ZAR 
had been paid out to roughly 14 000 victims.53       
 
C. Obligations under International Law to Prosecute and Punish 
Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations 
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 For states undergoing a transitional process, the question of how to deal 
with gross human rights offences of a prior regime is one of the most difficult and 
delicate decisions to take. Should perpetrators of the old regime be granted 
amnesty in order to ensure a smooth and peaceful transition and to stabilise the 
newly established yet still vulnerable democracy? And if so, should it be an 
unconditional, general amnesty or one which can only be granted on a case-by-
case approach and only after certain conditions have been met? Or is it rather 
advisable to prosecute and punish the members of the old regime in order to 
prevent widespread impunity and lawlessness?   
 
While it might be politically tempting to grant a general amnesty and 
thereby put an end to the past, it is debatable whether such an approach is in 
compliance with international law. While it is true that states are generally free to 
manage their internal affairs according to their own political convictions and 
assessments, this freedom might be restricted by international treaties and 
conventions a state has ratified and / or customary international law which, by its 
nature, is binding upon all states.54  
 
This section will elaborate on states’ obligation under international law to 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of gross human rights offences. It will first 
examine the content and scope of this obligation under various international 
treaties (I) before it addresses the question of whether customary international law 
obliges states to prosecute and punish grave human rights violations (II).   
 
I. International Treaties 
1. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 
 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention) entered into force on 12 January 1951. As of 12 
December 2006 it has been ratified by 140 states.55 South Africa acceded to the 
Convention on 10 December 1998. 
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Drafted in the wake of World War II, the Convention’s primary aim is to 
prevent the crime of genocide by ensuring its prosecution and punishment. 
Accordingly, article I states ‘that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or 
in time of war, is a crime under international law which [the contracting parties] 
undertake to prevent and punish’. Article IV stipulates explicitly that ‘[p]ersons 
committing genocide (...) shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’. Article V further 
requires states ‘to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide’ while 
article VI confirms that ‘[p]ersons charged with genocide (...) shall be tried by a 
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed 
(...)’. Since acts directed against a ‘political group’ are not covered by the 
Convention’s definition of genocide,56 its scope of application is relatively 
narrow.57 Yet, where it is applicable, the Convention is unambiguous in its 
requirement to prosecute and punish the crime of genocide, thus ruling out any 
form of amnesty.    
 
2. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture) entered into force on 26 
June 1987. As of 12 December 2006 it has been ratified by 144 states.58 South 
Africa signed the Convention on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 10 December 
1998. 
 
In the same way as the Genocide Convention, the Convention against 
Torture contains an unambiguous duty to prosecute and punish the acts it defines 
as criminal.59 Article 4 imposes an obligation on state parties to ‘ensure that all 
acts of torture are offences under (...) criminal law’ and ‘punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature’. Article 7 (1) further requires 
states to either extradite an alleged torturer or to ‘submit the case to [their] 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution’. Finally, by obliging states to 
establish universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture60 the Convention seeks to 
ensure that no offender will have the possibility to escape the consequences of his 
or her crime and be safe from prosecution.61 The Convention against Torture 
therefore requires the contracting parties to prosecute and punish any act of 
torture, thus forbidding any form of amnesty for torturers.        
 
3. The Geneva Conventions of 194962 and their Additional Protocols of 197763 
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 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are probably the only international 
treaties which are truly universally accepted. As of 12 December 2006 they have 
been ratified by 194 states while the Additional Protocols have been approved by 
166 (Additional Protocol I) and 162 (Additional Protocol II) countries.64 South 
Africa acceded to the Geneva Conventions on 31 March 1952 and to the 
Additional Protocols on 21 November 1995. 
 
While each of the four Conventions apply to different fields of warfare, 
they contain identical obligations with regard to the prosecution of certain serious 
violations of humanitarian law. Each of the four Conventions contains specific 
enumerations of grave breaches - such as torture, inhuman treatment, or wilful 
killing - which are war crimes under international law and are thus to be 
criminally prosecuted. Article 49 (1) Geneva Convention I eg obliges state parties 
‘to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons 
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches defined by the 
Convention whereas section (2) provides for the obligation ‘to bring such persons, 
regardless of their nationality, before [a competent court of law]’.65 State parties to 
the Conventions are therefore under an ‘absolute’ and non-derogable duty to 
prosecute grave breaches of the Conventions and to punish those found guilty.66  
 
However, it must be noted that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
are only applicable in international armed conflicts67 whereas non-international 
conflicts are covered by the rules and provisions of Additional Protocol II as well 
as by the minimum standard of the Convention’s common article 3. Yet neither of 
these provision contains explicit penal obligations or addresses the question of 
individual responsibility as such. One might therefore assume that the obligation 
to prosecute grave violations of the Conventions in a criminal court of law only 
applies to crimes committed in the course of an international armed conflict.      
 
 However, some scholars interpret the Geneva Conventions in a wider 
sense68 and argue that grave breaches of the Conventions can generally be 
‘committed against persons or property protected by the Convention[s]’69 which 
in turn gives rise to the subsequent question of who exactly falls under the 
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Convention’s shield. While it is true that the Geneva Conventions unfold their 
protective measures primarily in the context of international armed conflicts, it is 
equally true that persons referred to under the Convention’s common article 3 - ie 
actors of a non-international conflict - can also be regarded as protected persons 
under the Conventions.70 According to this reading, grave breaches of the 
Conventions can also be committed in the course of a non-international armed 
conflict.   
 
Yet, such an interpretation would contradict the Conventions’ explicit 
definitions of protected persons71 and would further blur the distinction between 
international conflicts on the one and non-international conflicts on the other side 
which was clearly not the intention of the drafters of the Conventions. The fact 
that article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (RS-ICC) 
still adheres to this differentiation72 shows that the international community is as 
yet not willing to renounce the legal distinction between these types of conflict. A 
more convincing interpretation can be found in the judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in Prosecutor v Tadic.73 While holding that the grave breaches provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions apply to international armed conflicts only, the Court 
ruled that ‘customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious 
violations of common Article 3, as supplemented by other general principles and 
rules on the protection of victims of internal armed conflict’.74 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) confirmed this view by stating - while 
referring to the Conventions’ common article 3 - that ‘authors of such egregious 
violations must incur individual criminal responsibility for their deeds’.75 Thus, 
serious violations of the Convention’s common article 3 must also not go 
unpunished.   
 
However, it has been argued that article 6 (5) Additional Protocol II might 
justify the granting of amnesty for serious violations of humanitarian law 
committed in the course of a non-international conflict.76 According to this 
provision, states  
 
‘shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated 
in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, 
whether they are interned or detained’. 
 
 However, this assumption is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
article 6 (5) Additional Protocol II which must be read and interpreted in light of 
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the general rules and provisions of the four Geneva Conventions. The ratio behind 
article 6 (5) is not to ensure widespread impunity but to protect combatants of a 
non-international conflict from excessive criminal prosecution once the conflict 
has ended. It is important to stress that while combatants of an international 
armed conflict may not be punished for their acts of hostilities as long as they 
were in compliance with international humanitarian law, combatants of a non-
international, internal conflict do not benefit from this privilege and ‘may be 
punished, under national legislation, for the mere fact of having fought, even if 
they respected international humanitarian law’.77 It is only and exclusively with 
regard to these specific circumstances that article 6 (5) Additional Protocol II is 
applicable. The travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol II support this 
interpretation by pointing out ‘that [article 6 (5)] aims at encouraging amnesty (...) 
for those detained or punished for the mere fact of having participated in 
hostilities [but] does not aim at an amnesty for those having violated international 
humanitarian law’.78 Article 6 (5) Additional Protocol II can thus not be consulted 
for justifying the granting of amnesty for violations of humanitarian law.   
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4. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) entered 
into force on 23 March 1976. As of 12 December 2006 it has been ratified by 160 
states.79 South Africa signed the Covenant on 3 October 1994 and ratified it on 10 
December 1998. 
 
Unlike the aforementioned treaties and conventions, the ICCPR does not 
contain an explicit provision requiring states to prosecute and punish any 
violations of the rights and freedoms enumerated by the Covenant. It thus does not 
seem to forbid the granting of amnesties, pardons or other forms of immunity. 
However, article 2 (3) (a) provides, that state parties to the Covenant ‘ensure that 
any persons whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have 
an effective remedy’. 
 
Some writers argue that the right to an effective remedy includes, on the 
side of the state, an obligation to investigate the violation and to prosecute the 
perpetrators.80 They argue that states’ duty to ensure the rights provided in the 
Covenant implies states’ obligation to prosecute their violators.81 By falling short 
of this obligation, states would create and promote a culture of impunity, making 
it impossible to ensure adherence to and respect for human rights in general.82  
 
The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, the monitoring body 
of the ICCPR, seems to support this position. In response to a communication 
regarding alleged acts of torture in Zaire, the Committee found that Zaire was 
‘under an obligation to (...) conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the 
victim’s] torture, to punish those found guilty (...) and to take steps to ensure that 
similar violations do not occur in the future’.83 In response to a similar 
communication regarding alleged incidents of extra-judicial executions in 
Surinam, the Committee urged the government ‘to take effective steps to 
investigate the killings [and] to bring to justice any persons found to be 
responsible for the death of the victims’.84 And in Almeida de Quinteros v 
Uruguay the Committee urged the Uruguayan government to take effective steps 
to bring to justice any persons found responsible for the disappearance of the 
victim.85 Finally, in General Comment No. 20 interpreting article 7 of the 
ICCPR,86 the Committee states, that torturers must be held responsible and that 
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amnesties in respect of acts of torture ‘are generally incompatible with the duty of 
States to investigate such acts’.87  
 
However, the language employed by the Committee does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that states are under the obligation to prosecute gross 
human rights offenders criminally. Terms like ‘to bring to justice’ or ‘to punish 
those found guilty’ might also be interpreted differently.88 Alternative measures 
such as dismissal from the military, cancelling pensions, banning the offender 
from public offices or requiring the payment of damages through civil proceedings 
or administrative fines might also be regarded as a form of punishment, serving 
justice.89 And the ‘general incompatibility’ of amnesties covering acts of torture 
as stated by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 20 implies 
that some forms of amnesties - like for example those granted by a truth 
commission after a full disclosure of the crimes committed - might be acceptable 
under the ICCPR.90 The travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR further substantiate 
that delegates considered but ultimately rejected a proposal brought forward by the  
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delegation of the Philippines which would have required states to prosecute 
violations of the Covenant criminally.91 To insist upon reading in such a 
requirement would therefore flatly contravene the intention of the drafters.92 
 
However, having recourse to the preparatory work of a convention is just 
one - supplementary - means of interpretation of a treaty provision.93 Even if one 
takes into account that the Committee’s comments are of a non-binding nature 
(‘soft law’) only,94 one cannot overlook the fact that ‘an increasing number of 
commentators, as well as the state-parties themselves, seem to consider the 
Committee’s comments as Covenant jurisprudence’95 which at the least is most 
authoritative for clarifying content and scope of the Covenant’s rights and duties. 
That states’ obligations set forth in the Covenant could be given greater precision 
through subsequent interpretation was further clearly contemplated by the 
different delegations throughout the drafting process.96 Against this background, 
the findings of the Committee are far from being irrelevant.   
 
While it is true that expressions like ‘to hold responsible’ or ‘to punish 
those found guilty’ do not necessarily connote criminal prosecutions, it is 
reasonable to assume that this connotation exists with regard to the most serious 
crimes like torture, forced disappearances or extra-judicial killings. In view of the 
importance that the Committee has attached to the right of life and the right not to 
be subjected to torture or forced disappearances,97 one simply cannot suppose that 
the Committee would regard mere disciplinary actions or administrative fines as a 
sufficient form of punishment for these most horrendous crimes. This view would 
further be in line with the requirements of the Convention against Torture the 
obligations of which the Committee certainly did not want to undermine. It further 
reflects the general principle of law that crime and sanction are interrelated and 
that the latter must be appropriate to the severity and gravity of the first.98                  
 
Under this interpretation of the Committee’s jurisprudence, the right to an 
effective remedy as enshrined in article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR does impose an obligation 
on state parties to prosecute at least the most severe offences mentioned above. In 
contrast, with regard to other less serious crimes, depending on the context and the 
specific situation, other forms of sanctions and conditional or even ‘blanket’ 
amnesties might be permissible.   
 
5. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
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  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) entered into force on 3 September 1953. As of 14 
December 2006 it has been ratified by all of the 46 Council of Europe’s member 
states.99 
 
 The ECHR does not contain an explicit obligation to prosecute and punish 
gross violations of its protected rights. However, article 1 commits state parties to 
‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined’ in 
the Convention which has been interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights as including an affirmative duty to remedy violations of the Convention’s 
rights.100 The Court has had comparatively few occasions to evaluate the role of 
criminal prosecutions in protecting the Convention’s rights and has therefore 
addressed this issue only rarely: in X and Y v Netherlands101 for instance, the 
Court found the Dutch government in violation of the ECHR due to a gap in 
Dutch law that prevented a victim of rape from instituting criminal proceedings 
against her assailant. However, in Ireland v United Kingdom,102 the Court 
refrained from directing the UK to institute criminal proceedings against certain 
members of the security forces who were responsible for violations of the 
Convention’s rights. These inconsistencies make it impossible to establish a 
general obligation to prosecute and punish gross human rights offences under the 
ECHR.   
 
II. Customary International Law 
 
 Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines 
customary international law as ‘international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law’. In accordance with this traditional definition, it is 
widely agreed that custom is formed of two constituent elements:103  
 
• Firstly, there has to be a general, uniform, and consistent practice of states (state practice). 
While the practice in question does not have to be universally accepted, there has to be a long-
term and widespread compliance by a considerable number of states.104  
• This practice has, secondly, to be accompanied by a sense of legal duty (opinio juris). States 
must believe that the practice in question is not merely an act of courtesy or morality, but rather 
derives from legal obligations, imposed by international law.105   
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  However, definitional uncertainties remain. When exactly eg is a practice 
general, consistent and uniform? And how many states must be convinced that a 
certain  behaviour is legally required? Yet, the most significant uncertainty in  this  
regard is the question of delimitation of state practice and opinio juris, which shall 
be explored in more depth. 
 
1. The Delimitation of State Practice and Opinio Juris 
 
There is little agreement about the delimitation of state practice and opinio 
juris. While concrete physical acts - like the adoption of a law, the initiating of 
legal proceedings before a court of law, or the payment of compensation for 
victims of crime - are broadly agreed to be a form of state practice, commentators 
disagree about whether written or even oral acts - such as diplomatic or political 
statements, the explicit acquiescence to a UN General Assembly resolution or the 
ratification of an international convention - should also fall in this category.106 The 
answer to this question has significant and far-reaching consequences since the 
proof of custom is a difficult undertaking which might either be facilitated or 
further complicated, depending on what view one chooses to take.   
 
The implications of this controversy may be observed with regard to the 
issue of criminal prosecutions of grave human rights offenders: some writers 
argue that the status of ratification of the aforementioned international treaties is 
nearly universal and that state practice - if measured by the status of ratification - 
may well be considered as general, uniform and consistent in the above mentioned 
sense.107 This standpoint seems to find support in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases judgement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which reads that a 
treaty provision may well become a general rule of international law when there is 
‘a very widespread and representative participation in the convention’.108 Yet, 
others argue that the ratification of international treaties must rather be regarded as 
an expression of opinio juris,109 and that state practice - if measured exclusively 
by concrete physical acts110 - is rather sparse than widespread and consistent in 
this field of law.111 Against this background, the issue of delimitation becomes 
one of utmost importance. 
 
The problem of delimitation stems mainly from the fact that states are legal 
entities which can express their ‘thoughts’ and ‘views’ only through their organs 
and representatives ie through diplomatic statements, announcements, etc. 
However, by giving a political statement or announcing a certain position, a state 
official - be it a politician, a diplomat or some other civil servant - performs 
necessarily also a physical act which - while expressing an opinion - can equally 
be regarded as a an act of state practice. Thus, strictly speaking, under this reading, 
state practice and opinio juris are quasi congruent.  
 
Yet, such an interpretation would render the element of state practice 
meaningless and would reduce it to nothing more than a simple mirror of opinio 
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juris. The proof of opinio juris would almost inevitably entail the evidence of a 
sufficient practice of states without having to take into account states’ actual 
conduct on the ground. This could, however, lead to a dangerous division between 
the development of the law on the one and states’ behaviour on the other side. Yet, 
when law and reality drift too far apart, legal rules and provisions run the risk of 
becoming ineffective and eventually invalid. The distinction between the two 
elements should therefore be maintained.  
 
A preferable interpretation would therefore be to differentiate between 
state practice in a broader and in a narrower sense of the term. In the wider sense 
of the term, state practice could be any possible act or omission, including any oral 
or written statement or other written acts. However, since for the purpose of 
establishing a rule of customary international law, a given practice must be 
accompanied by the conviction of its legal requirement (opinio juris), in the 
narrower sense of the term only those acts or omissions should be considered as 
legitimate forms of state practice, which in fact are theoretically and practically 
able to be accompanied by this conviction. It is this narrower sense of the term on 
which the delimitation of state practice and opinio juris should be based.  
 
Yet, when one wants to qualify diplomatic or political statements, the 
acquiescence to UN General Assembly resolutions or the ratification of 
international treaties as legitimate forms of state practice, where is the legal norm 
which would require such a conduct? It is difficult to think of any legal rule which 
would require a state to issue a certain statement, to rule in favour of a certain 
resolution or to accede to or ratify a particular international treaty. Rather, these 
acts are done out of political considerations and not because states feel obliged to 
act in this particular way. 
 
 A simple example might highlight these considerations. With regard to the 
question, whether eg torture is a crime under international law, one may examine 
the treatment of prisoners, national legislation prohibiting the use of torture or 
criminal investigations into alleged acts of torture as legitimate forms of state 
practice. In contrast, opinio juris may be deduced from diplomatic or political 
statements condemning the use of torture as violating international law or from the 
status of ratification of the Convention against Torture or other relevant 
international conventions. The fact, however, that the Convention against Torture 
has now been ratified by 144 of the world’s 194 states,112 cannot be quoted as 
evidence of a sufficiently general, uniform and consistent practice of states, since 
no state is legally required to sign, ratify or accede to the Convention. 
 
 Accordingly, for the purpose of establishing a rule of customary 
international law, mere oral or written statements or acts can only be considered as 
an expression of opinio juris. State practice, in contrast, must be found in states’ 
behaviour on the ground ie in concrete physical acts.  
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2. State Practice 
 
If only concrete physical acts may be considered as providing evidence in 
favour or against the existence of a certain practice of states, one has to look at 
criminal investigations, prosecutions and trials in order to determine whether 
customary international law requires states to prosecute and punish gross human 
rights offences. A particular emphasis must thereby be placed on the practice of 
those states which only recently emerged from times of unrest, civil strife or 
authoritarian rule.113  
 
a. Examples of Positive State Practice 
 
State practice in favour of the existence of an obligation to prosecute may 
be found in virtually all parts of the world. In Europe, for instance, after the end of 
World War II, France, Belgium and the Netherlands tried hundred of thousands of 
Nazi-collaborators for their crimes committed during German occupation.114 
Germany itself tried many of the former guards of the Auschwitz concentration 
camp in the so-called Frankfurter Auschwitz trials,115 although it has to be 
admitted that many other Nazi-perpetrators did not have to face criminal 
prosecutions. As has been mentioned above, Greece tried and convicted several of 
the leaders who ruled the country in the 1960s and 1970s only months after its 
transition to democracy,116 whereas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, 
internationalised hybrid courts, composed of international and national judges and 
staff, still investigate and prosecute the serious violations of humanitarian law 
committed during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, which are not dealt with by the 
ICTY in The Hague.117 
 
 In Africa, it is Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia which are the front-
runners in the fight against impunity. Rwanda, for instance, tries its genocide 
suspects not only before the ICTR but also before its national criminal courts and 
before newly created, community based so-called Gacaca courts.118 Sierra Leone, 
in contrast, was the first state which set up an internationalised hybrid court for 
trying certain perpetrators of international crimes committed during its recent civil 
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war.119 And in Ethiopia, the trials of former senior government officials, including 
former President Mengistu Hailemariam on charges of genocide, torture and other 
serious crimes are still in progress.120 
 
 In South America, progress can be reported from Argentina and Chile 
where far-reaching amnesty laws have been repeatedly challenged and partly 
overturned. In Argentina, the so-called ‘Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws’ have 
been declared null and void, whereas in Chile former President Augusto Pinochet 
was stripped of his legal immunity and placed under house arrest shortly before 
his death in December 2006.121 Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori is 
currently awaiting his extradition to Peru after his arrest in Chile in November 
2005 on charges of murder, forced disappearance and torture,122 while former 
Argentine President Isabel Peron now faces extradition from Spain after two 
international arrest warrants were issued earlier this year by the Argentine 
judiciary.123 
 
 In Asia, lastly, internationalised hybrid courts in Timor-Leste and in the 
Kingdom of Cambodia are looking into past human rights abuses in their 
respective states.124 
 
b. Examples of Negative State Practice 
 
However, examples of a negative practice of states are at least equally 
widespread and impossible to overlook. Several states - like eg Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Haiti, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Bahrain, Lebanon or Senegal - have 
enacted far-reaching amnesty laws which shield offenders of serious human rights 
violations from criminal prosecution.125 In Turkey, Uzbekistan and elsewhere in 
the region, impunity for human rights violations remain a pressing problem as is 
the case in many countries of the Middle East.126 In Russia, crimes, committed in 
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the context of the Chechen War, are rarely investigated or prosecuted127 and in 
Sudan, authorities do little to address the current situation of impunity in the 
region of Darfur.128 And while Uganda has already granted amnesty to the leaders 
and fighters of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army,129 further amnesty laws can be 
expected to be adopted in Algeria,130 Afghanistan131 and Colombia.132  
 
3. Opinio Juris 
 
Unlike the proof of a consistent practice of states, opinio juris is rather 
easy to establish. As has been mentioned above,133 opinio juris can be deduced 
from a variety of different acts such as, inter alia, diplomatic or political 
statements, votes in the UN General Assembly or other UN organs, explanations, 
statements or votes in other international organisations as well as from the status 
of ratification of international treaties and conventions. Given the fact that the four 
Geneva Conventions are now universally accepted and that all of the other 
aforementioned universally applicable treaties are ratified by at least three quarters 
of the international community as a whole, one may well argue that states have 
expressed their commitment to prosecute and punish gross human rights violations 
on a sufficiently wide scale. 
 
4. Assessment 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from these findings? There is certainly 
sufficient opinio juris for the emergence of a customary international norm which 
would oblige states to investigate, prosecute and punish grave violations of human 
rights. Yet, it remains debatable, whether state practice is sufficiently general, 
uniform and consistent in this field of law. While the aforementioned examples of 
a positive practice of states should not lightly be swept aside, it is impossible to 
overlook that impunity for gross human rights violations still persists in many 
states of the world and that state practice in this field of law is rather 
heterogeneous than uniform. Hence, while the emergence of a custom based 
obligation to prosecute should not be ruled out for the future, customary 
international law in its present state does not contain such a duty.  
 
D. Obligations under International Law to Provide Compensation for 
Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations 
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 In the aftermath of a military conflict or other widespread violations of 
internationally recognised human rights, the international community as a whole 
as well as the states concerned tend to focus predominantly on the role of the 
perpetrators of gross human rights offences. As has been shown above, this is, in 
general, not only desirable but rather required by various international human 
rights treaties as well as international humanitarian law. However, to deal with the 
perpetrators is only one side of the coin and indeed international law is not just 
concerned with the prosecution and punishment of the offenders but also with the 
rights and needs of their victims. Numerous international treaties contain specific 
provisions regarding victims’ rights of reparation and / or compensation and ‘soft 
law’ like the 1985 UN General Assembly Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power134 or the recently adopted 2006 
UN General Assembly resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law135 
(UN Basic Principles and Guidelines) has further contributed to the development 
of victims’ rights in recent years.  
 
 This section will elaborate on states’ obligation under international law to 
provide compensation for victims of gross human rights offences. It will first seek 
to clarify the rather confusing terminology in the field of victims’ rights (I). 
Subsequently,   it   will  examine  the  content  and  scope  of  victims’   rights   of  
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compensation under various international treaties (II). Finally, it will turn to the 
question whether customary international law requires states to provide 
compensation for violations of the most fundamental human rights (III).  
 
I. Terminology 
 
 There are common misconceptions with regard to the terminology in the 
field of victims’ rights. Terms like ‘effective remedy’, ‘reparation’, 
‘compensation’, ‘restitution’, ‘satisfaction’ or ‘rehabilitation’ are often used in an 
interchangeable way without any clear distinction. Following the terminology of 
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law,136 a victim’s right to remedies 
includes the ‘right to (...) 
 
• (a) Equal and effective access to justice; 
• (b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; 
• (c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and reparation mechanisms’.137 
 
According to this definition, ‘remedy’ is the most general term used with 
regard to victim’s rights. It refers to the substance of relief (b), to the procedure 
through which this can be obtained (a) and to the relevant information needed to 
exercise these rights effectively (c). However, the term ‘remedy’ is sometimes also 
used in a stricter sense of the word, referring just to the procedural means - to the 
effective access to justice - by which a right can be enforced.138 
 
In contrast, the term ‘reparation’ refers only to the substance of relief ie to 
what the victim seeks to obtain. This may  comprise, in accordance with principles  
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15 to 23, a variety of different forms such as restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.  
 
‘Restitution’ should, as far as possible, ‘restore the victim to the original 
situation before the (...) [violation] (...) occurred’.139 This may include, inter alia, 
the restoration of liberty, identity or citizenship, the return to one’s place of 
residence or the restoration of employment or return of property.140  
 
‘Compensation’ is to be understood as ‘financial compensation’ which 
‘should be provided for any economically assessable damage’141 resulting from a 
specific violation of one’s rights, such as, inter alia, physical or mental harm, 
material damages and loss of earnings, moral damages or lost opportunities, 
including employment or education.  
 
Measures of ‘rehabilitation’ should include psychological and medical care 
as well as legal and social services.142 
 
Acts of ‘satisfaction’ may include, inter alia, measures like the disclosure 
of the truth, the restoration of the dignity of the victims, public apologies 
including the acknowledgement of the facts and the acceptance of responsibility, 
or judicial sanctions against offenders and perpetrators.143 
 
‘Guarantees of non-repetition’ finally might comprise measures to 
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, to ensure an effective civilian control 
of the security forces or to promote mechanisms for preventing and monitoring 
social conflicts.144      
 
It should be stressed that any of these measures constitute reparations in 
the sense of the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines. However, since reparations 
‘should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered’,145 it 
depends on the specific circumstances of each case, which form of reparation must 
in fact be provided. While an official apology or psychological or medical care can 
be important and meaningful acts, it is financial compensation which matters most 
and which is probably the most helpful and welcomed form of reparation for many 
of the often impoverished victims. In cases of particularly gruesome and gross 
violations of the most fundamental human rights, financial compensation might 
also be the only appropriate and proportional form of reparation.  
 
II. International Treaties 
1. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
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 The Convention against Torture provides explicitly for states’ obligation to 
ensure torture victims’ right to obtain adequate compensation for their suffering. 
According to article 14 (1), states are obliged to  
 
‘ensure in [their] legal system[s] that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has 
an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his 
dependants shall be entitled to compensation’.  
 
It must be noted that article 14 (1) only refers to ‘an act of torture’ as 
defined in article 1 (1) of the Convention and does not seem to cover other forms 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the sense of article 16 
(1). Furthermore, article 16 (1), while specifically referring to articles 10, 11, 12 
and 13, does not refer to the obligations contained in article 14, thus seemingly 
restricting the scope of applicability of article 14 (1) to acts of torture only. 
However, in Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v Yugoslavia,146 the Committee against Torture 
found that ‘article 14 of the Convention does not mean that the state party is not 
obliged to grant redress and fair and adequate compensation to the victim of an act 
in breach of article 16 of the Convention. The positive obligations that flow from 
the first sentence of article 16 of the Convention include an obligation to grant 
redress and compensate the victims of an act in breach of that provision’. The 
Committee thus extended the scope of applicability of article 14 considerably. 
While the ‘views’ of the Committee are legally not binding,147 they provide 
interpretation for the Convention’s rules and provisions and are therefore most 
authoritative for clarifying content and scope of the Convention’s rights and 
obligations.   
 
However, article 14 (1) does not contain a direct right for victims of torture 
to obtain adequate compensation. It just requires states to ensure that their legal 
systems allow for compensation to be paid. The Committee against Torture has 
stressed this point in a number  of its findings by recommending that states legally 
recognise the right of victims to fair and adequate compensation148 or establish 
compensation funds for victims of torture or other forms of ill-treatment.149  
 
2. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 
 
 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 
contain a number of articles relating to the provision of compensation. Article 51 
Geneva Convention I eg states that ‘[n]o High Contracting Party shall be allowed 
to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by 
itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of [grave] breaches [of these 
Conventions]’.150 Article 91 Additional Protocol I stipulates that ‘[a] Party to the 
conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, 
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if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces’. 
 
 Yet, whether these obligations exist vis-à-vis the individual itself or rather 
vis-à-vis the injured state remains an open question. The wording of the relevant 
articles gives little information in this regard. However, the majority of national 
courts do not recognize an individual right to compensation under international 
humanitarian law.151 It is true that eg under the UN Compensation Commission or 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission such individual rights exist,152 but this 
should not be misunderstood as confirmation of the existence of a general 
individual right to compensation under international humanitarian law. Even 
Schwager, who argues strongly for the existence of such a right, admits that the 
existing individual rights under these Commission’s statutes do not flow directly 
from international humanitarian law but have been conferred upon the individual 
by the respective Commission’s founding documents.153 Under present 
international law, states’ obligation to provide compensation for violations of 
international humanitarian law is thus only owed to the injured state, not to the 
injured individual. An individual right to financial compensation under the 
Geneva Conventions and / or their Additional Protocols can therefore not be 
established.   
 
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
  
The ICCPR contains a number of articles providing for reparations and / or 
compensation  for  victims  of human rights abuses. Firstly,  as  mentioned  above,  
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article 2 (3) (a) obliges state parties to provide for an effective remedy for any 
violation of rights or freedoms recognised by the Covenant. More specifically, 
article 9 (5) gives ‘anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention 
(...) an enforceable right to compensation’. Article 14 (6) finally stipulates that 
anyone who has been a victim of a miscarriage of justice ‘shall be compensated 
according to law’. 
 
For the purpose of the present study, the most relevant provision is article 
2 (3) (a) ICCPR. The case law of the Human Rights Committee - especially those 
views dealing with articles 6 (right to life) and 7 (right not to be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) - is again most 
enlightening for purposes of the interpretation and understanding of this rule.  
 
In Irene Bleier Lewenhoff and Rosa Valiño de Bleier v Uruguay,154 the 
Committee was of the view ‘that there are serious reasons to believe that the 
ultimate violation of article 6 has been perpetrated’ and urged the Uruguayan 
government ‘to bring to justice any persons found to be responsible for [Eduardo 
Bleier’s] death, disappearance or ill-treatment and to pay compensation to him or 
his family for any injury which he had suffered’. In Lilo Miango v Zaire,155 the 
Committee equally found a violation of articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant and called 
on the Zairian authorities ‘to pay compensation to [the victims] family’. In another 
case against Uruguay,156 the Committee held that article 7 of the Covenant had 
been violated and concluded that the state of Uruguay ‘is under an obligation to 
provide [the victim] with effective remedies and, in particular, with compensation 
for physical and mental injury and suffering’ and in Juana Peñarrieta, Maria Pura 
de Toro, et al v Bolivia,157 the Committee, having established a violation of article 
7, regarded Bolivia as being ‘under an obligation, in accordance with the 
provisions of article 2 of the Covenant, (...) to grant [the victims] compensation’.  
 
These cases are only some illustrative examples of the Human Rights 
Committee’s extensive jurisprudence.158 However, they show quite clearly the 
Committee’s interpretation of victims’ right to an effective remedy as being 
enshrined in article 2 (3) (a) and the Committee’s standpoint with regard to 
financial compensation, at least in cases of grave human rights abuses such as 
murder or torture. One can thus draw the conclusion that article 2 (3) (a) ICCPR 
obliges state parties to provide reparations for victims of human rights abuses, 
which should include compensation at least in cases of particularly gross 
violations.  
 
4. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
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 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) entered into force on 4 January 1969. As of 12 December 
2006 it has been ratified by 173 states.159 South Africa signed the Convention on 3 
October 1994 and ratified it on 10 December 1998. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, article 6 is the most relevant provision. It 
obliges state parties to ‘assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective 
protection and remedies (...) against any acts of racial discrimination which violate 
his / her human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this Convention, as 
well as the right to seek (...) just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any 
damage suffered as a result of such discrimination’.  
 
While article 6 thus acknowledges the right to ‘adequate reparation or 
satisfaction’, it does not contain any references to the question of financial 
compensation. However, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination  states in its General Recommendation No. 26 that the  punishment  
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of the perpetrator of the discrimination is not necessarily enough to secure the 
victims’ rights contained in article 6 and urges ‘the courts and other competent 
authorities [to] consider awarding financial compensation for damage, material or 
moral, suffered by a victim, whenever appropriate’.160 Following this stance, in 
Mohammed Hassan Gelle v Denmark161 the Committee recommended ‘adequate 
compensation for the moral injury’ suffered by the petitioner and in Dragan 
Durmic v Serbia and Montenegro162 the Committee advised to provide ‘just and 
adequate compensation commensurate with the moral damage [of the petitioner]’.  
 
However, it must be noted that the wording of these texts is weak. General 
Recommendation No. 26 only requires states to ‘consider’ the awarding of 
financial compensation and in both Communications the Committee only 
‘recommends’ to provide adequate compensation. Terms like ‘to be obliged’ or 
‘being under an obligation’ as used for instance by the Human Rights Committee 
or the Committee against Torture163 have carefully been avoided. It seems that in 
the view of the Committee, while regarding the payment of compensation as 
desirable, there is yet no strict obligation in this respect. While article 6 thus 
obliges states to provide ‘adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage 
suffered’, it does not contain the obligation to compensate victims of racial 
discrimination financially. 
 
5. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
  
Like the ICCPR, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms contains a range of provisions providing for 
reparations and / or compensation for victims of human rights abuses. According 
to article 5 (5), victims of an unlawful arrest or detention ‘shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation’. Article 13 provides for an effective remedy 
for ‘[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention [has 
been] violated’. Article 41 finally states that ‘[i]f the Court finds that there has 
been a violation of the Convention (...), and if the internal law of the High 
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court 
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party’. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has awarded ‘just satisfaction’ in 
well over 100 cases164 in which restitutio in integrum were either impossible 
because of the nature of the breach or where the internal law of the state concerned 
did not allow for it. Unlike its meaning in general international law, in the context 
of the ECHR the term ‘just satisfaction’ has been interpreted in a more 
comprehensive sense and may include pecuniary compensation as well as 
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compensation for non-pecuniary damages.165 However, in some cases, the Court 
found that a favourable decision on the merits were in itself just satisfaction in the 
sense of article 41 and that a further award of financial compensation was 
therefore not appropriate.166 While the Court therefore considers itself competent 
to award compensation, it enjoys - as can be deduced from the adjective ‘just’ and 
the term ‘if necessary’ - ‘a certain discretion in the exercise of [this] power’.167 
Given these discretionary powers, it is debatable whether the individual has a right 
to ‘just satisfaction’ prior to the Court’s judgement. Yet once the judgement has 
been delivered, the existence of this right is indisputable.168  
 
In practice, however, this distinction is of little relevance at least for the 
most severe violations of the Convention’s rights, since the Court - despite its 
margin of discretion - has seldom denied victims’ claims for compensation in 
cases of serious human rights infringements. A cursory review of the Court’s 
relevant decisions reveals that financial compensation has been granted in almost 
all of these particular cases with awards ranging between 10 000 £ to 30 000 £ for 
non-pecuniary damages only.169 The Court has frequently stressed that it makes its 
assessments on an equitable basis, thus taking into account specific circumstances 
such as eg the gravity or the seriousness of the violation in question.170 Against 
this background one might well argue that - at least in cases of serious violations 
of human rights - article 41 contains a true and comprehensive right to ‘just 
satisfaction’ in the form of financial compensation even prior to the Court’s 
decision. This right is vested in the individuals themselves and directed against the 
offending state with the individual as the right- and the state as the duty-holder. 
States’ corresponding obligation to afford ‘just satisfaction’ is therefore not - at 
least not primarily - an obligation towards the other contracting parties but is owed 
to the injured individual.171 It is this shift in the role of the right-holder which 
differentiates the ECHR’s reparation regime form those of the aforementioned 
treaties and conventions.172 
 
6. The American Convention on Human Rights 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) entered into force 
on 18 July 1978. As of 13 December 2006 it has been ratified by 24 of the 35 
member states of the Organization of American States.173  
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 The American Convention on Human Rights contains equally far reaching 
provisions regarding victims’ rights to compensation for gross human rights 
abuses. For the purpose of the present study, the most important of these 
provisions is article 63 (1) which enjoins the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights to ‘rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation 
that constituted the breach of [rights or freedoms protected by the Convention 
shall] be remedied and that fair compensation [shall] be paid to the injured party’. 
Judgements stipulating ‘compensatory damages may be executed in the country 
concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the execution of 
judgments against the state’ in accordance with article 68 (2) of the Convention.   
 
 In its landmark Velásquez Rodríguez case174 the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights interpreted these provisions and the obligations contained in article 
1 (1) of the Convention in a most comprehensive manner. Taking into account 
article 63 (1), the Court held that, as a consequence of states’ obligation ‘to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized [by the Convention] and to ensure to 
all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedoms’,175 ‘States must prevent, investigate and punish any violations of [these] 
rights (...) and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and 
provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting form the violations’.176 
Referring to the Factory at Chorzów case,177 the Court deemed that ‘[it] is a 
principle of international law that every violation of an international obligation 
which results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation [and that] 
[c]ompensation (...) is the most usual way of doing so’.178 The Court thus 
embarked on a very victim-friendly course and deliberately chose to disregard its 
margin of discretion179 in regards to the awarding of compensation. However, the 
Court stopped short of awarding punitive damages, stating that the term ‘fair 
compensation’ as referred to in article 63 (1) is of a compensatory nature.180 
 
It is however surprising that the Court based at least parts of its reasoning 
on the Factory at Chorzów case. After all - as will be shown below - this case 
does not relate to any individual rights but deals exclusively with states’ right to 
compensation for internationally wrongful acts. Nevertheless, it has been 
repeatedly referred to as supporting the existence of an individual right to 
                                                                                                                                  
Trinidad and Tobago denounced its ratification on 26 May 1998. Canada and the United States are 
not parties to the Convention.   
174
 Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras) (Merits) [1988] Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (Ser C) No 4 and Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Velásquez Rodríguez v 
Honduras) (Compensation) [1989] Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser C) No 7.  
175
 Article 1 (1) ACHR. 
176
 Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras) (Merits) (note 174) para 166. 
177
 Chorzów Factory (Germany v Poland) (Jurisdiction) [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No 9 at 21 and 
Chorzów Factory (Germany v Poland) (Merits) [1928] PCIJ (Ser A) No 17 at 29. 
178
 Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras) (Compensation) (note 174) para 
25.  
179
 Similar to article 41 ECHR, this margin of discretion can be deduced from the term ‘if 
appropriate’ in article 63 (1) ACHR. 
180
 Velásquez Rodríguez Case (Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras) (Compensation) (note 174) paras 
37-39.  
compensation for gross human rights abuses under international law.181 Most 
recently for instance, the ICJ, in its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, after referring 
to the judgement on the merits, concluded that  
 
‘Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and 
other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of 
the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In the event that such restitution should prove to be 
materially impossible, Israel has an obligation to compensate the persons in question for the 
damage suffered. The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in 
accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having 
suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall’s construction’.182 
 
However, while it is true that the Factory at Chorzów case laid down some 
fundamental principles with regard to the law of reparation, it does not say at any 
point that states are under a legal obligation to provide compensation to their own 
nationals or indeed to any individual in cases where they might have suffered 
harm at the hands of public authorities.183 In contrast, the Court stated quite 
clearly ‘that the object of the German application can only be to obtain reparation 
due to a wrong suffered by Germany in her [own] capacity (...)’184 and confirmed 
the view of the agent for the German government that ‘[t]he present dispute is (...) 
a dispute between governments and nothing but a dispute between 
governments’.185 The Factory at Chorzów case might therefore be consulted as an 
authority for compensation claims on an inter-state level but not for the existence 
of an individual right to compensation under international law. 
 
 However, there is one passage in the judgment which could be of 
considerable value although it seems to be repeatedly overlooked. After having 
concluded that the present case only deals with the rights and obligations of states, 
the Court continued that ‘[i]nternational law does not prevent one State from 
granting to another the right to have recourse to international arbitral tribunals in 
order to obtain the direct award to nationals of the latter State of compensation for 
damage suffered by them as a result of infractions of international law by the first 
State’.186 In other words, if states agree that individuals shall have a direct right of 
compensation for violations of international law, they might grant such rights 
according to their corresponding intentions. Numerous international agreements 
conferring direct rights upon individuals have been concluded since.187 
 
 But is the ACHR such a direct-rights-granting treaty? The wording of the 
Convention seems to suggest this assumption. Many of its articles start with the 
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phrase ‘[e]very person has the right to (...)’188 whereby ‘person’ has to be 
understood as ‘every human being’.189 In contrast, where the Convention refers to 
the state parties, it does so expresis verbis.190 However, it is interesting to note that 
article 63 ACHR is the only provision in the entire Convention which uses the 
ambiguous term ‘injured party’ which leaves some room to manoeuvre for further 
interpretation: are only states ‘injured parties’ in the sense of article 63 or can 
individuals also be subsumed under this indeterminate term? 
 
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted article 63 
ACHR in the latter sense without giving any explanations for its finding.191 
However, two good reasons support the interpretation of the Court:  
 
The first derives from the wording of article 63 (1) (1) itself which states 
that the Court, in the event of a violation of a right or freedom protected by the 
Convention, ‘shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right 
or freedom that was violated’. Yet, since the rights and freedoms ensured by the 
Convention are individual rights and individual freedoms which can only be 
enjoyed by individual persons, only they can be ‘the injured party’ in the sense of 
article 63 (1) (1). It thus appears to be only logical to interpret the term ‘injured 
party’ as used in article 63 (1) (2) in the same way.     
 
 The second reason in support of the Court’s interpretation relates to the 
Convention’s most effective implementation. ‘Ordinary’ international treaties are 
usually enforced by states in whose interest the respective agreements were made. 
However, international human rights conventions are concluded in the interest of 
the people, who are the primary beneficiaries of the conventions’ rights and 
freedoms. Accordingly, states’ willingness to enforce these kinds of conventions is 
less pronounced than it is with regard to ‘conventional’ international treaties, since 
it is not their rights and interests that are primarily at stake. 
 
 In contrast, if the individual beneficiaries are able to defend their rights and 
interests themselves and to claim compensation in their own right, violations of 
the ACHR are much more likely to be taken up and brought to the Court’s 
attention. After all, the prospect of receiving compensation oneself is a much 
stronger incentive for initiating legal action than the prospect that some foreign 
states might be granted compensation for one’s own suffering. It further does not 
seem to be in compliance with the concept  and nature of compensation in general,  
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if states may receive compensation for violations of rights and freedoms of which 
they are not the primary beneficiaries.  
 
Accordingly, similar to the legal position under the ECHR, a state’s duty to 
provide ‘fair compensation’ is again primarily owed to the injured individual 
rather than to the individual’s state of origin or to the other contracting parties, 
which gives the individual at least a partial legal personality under the ACHR.192    
 
7. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) 
entered into force on 21 October 1986. As of 23 June 2006 it has been ratified by 
all of the African Union’s 53 member states.193 South Africa signed and ratified 
the Charter on 9 July 1996. 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides for a right to 
‘adequate compensation’ in article 21 (1) and (2). According to this provision 
‘[a]ll peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources’ and ‘[in] 
no case shall a people be deprived of it’. ‘In case of spoliation the dispossessed 
people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an 
adequate compensation’. So far, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights had to adjudicate only once on this provision. In The Social and Economic 
Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria194 the 
Commission found the Nigerian policy to grant multinational companies the right 
to exploit oil in the Ogoniland to be in violation of article 21 and appealed to the 
Nigerian government to ensure adequate compensation to the victims.  
 
 It should however be noted that article 21 of the African Charter does not 
contain any individual rights but rather rights of peoples. Yet, without giving any 
further explanation, the Commission recommended the payment of compensation 
also in cases where individual rights have been infringed. In John K. Modise v 
Botswana195 for instance, the Commission found Botswana in violation of various 
articles of the African Charter and consequently urged the Botswana government 
‘to take appropriate measures to recognise Mr. John Modise as its citizen by 
descent and [to] compensate him adequately for the violations of his rights 
occasioned’. In Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan196 the Commission 
requested ‘the Government of Sudan to duly compensate the victims’ who were 
tortured in detention. And in a case against Burkina Faso,197 the Commission 
recommended the Republic of Burkina Faso to ‘[compensate] the victims of the 
human rights violations stated in the complaint’. 
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  It must be stressed that apart from article 21 there is no other explicit 
provision in the African Charter providing for financial compensation of victims 
of human rights abuses. The Commission further never expressly revealed on what 
legal basis it recommends state parties to pay compensation to victims of such 
offences. But if one looks at the wording of articles 1198 and 2199 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and compares it with the wording of 
article 1 of the American Convention of Human Rights,200 the similarities are 
striking. Accordingly, in Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l'Homme et des 
Peuples v Burkina Faso201 the Commission held that article 1 of the African 
Charter not only requires states to ‘recognise the rights, duties and freedoms 
enshrined in the Charter, [but] also [to] commit themselves to respect them and to 
take  measures  to  give  effect to them. (...) [Failure] to  ensure  respect  of  the[se]  
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rights (...) constitutes a violation of the Charter’. Both treaties therefore oblige 
states to ‘respect’ and ‘ensure the exercise’ of their respective rights and freedoms. 
Given the fact that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Velásquez 
Rodriguez case deduced from this obligation that states must ‘provide 
compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation’202 one might 
assume that the Commission - while not stating this explicitly - grounds its 
recommendations regarding individual victims’ compensation on the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
 
 Yet, this is just an assumption which cannot conceal the remaining legal 
uncertainties. As long as the Commission does not clarify the legal basis for its 
award of compensation and given the Committee’s so far sparse jurisprudence, it 
would be premature to speak - apart from the peoples’ right of article 21 - of a true 
and real obligation to provide financial compensation for victims of human rights 
abuses under the African Charter. 
 
III. Customary International Law 
 
As has been shown, various international treaties oblige state parties to 
provide financial compensation for victims of gross human rights abuses. 
However, since treaties can generally not create any obligations for non-state 
parties but are only able to bind those states which have consented to them,203 one 
cannot speak of a truly universal obligation unless customary international law 
provides for similar rules and duties. 
 
As has been mentioned above, a rule of customary international law 
requires for its emergence, state practice and opinio juris. Although it has been 
emphasised that the rules and obligations contained in the UN Basic Principles 
and Guidelines ‘do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations’204 ie 
only reflect existing customary international law, this might be a rather misleading 
formulation. While it is true that the consensus orientated drafting process of the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines resulted in a draft which finally enjoyed 
broad sympathies on the international stage,205 this fact alone can hardly justify the 
assumption that the text in its entirety is an expression of pre-existing customary 
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rules.206 A close examination of states’ practice and their corresponding 
explanations and justifications in respect of victims’ rights of compensation is 
therefore unavoidable. Before this can be done, some observations must however 
be made with regard to the law of state responsibility which provides for the scope 
of states’ responsibilities for violations of international law outside a specific 
treaty regime.  
 
1. The Law of State Responsibility 
 
The law of state responsibility consists mainly of customary rules and 
principles since there is no comprehensive international convention regulating the 
rights and duties of states in the event of an internationally wrongful act. Although 
in 2001 the International Law Commission adopted a set of Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC-Draft Articles), 
these norms are still just a draft without legal force in a proper sense. However, 
despite this fact, they might serve as a helpful legal guidance, since they entail - at 
least in parts and apart from some progressive  legal developments - a codification  
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of existing customary rules.207 Whether or not states decide to convert them into a 
fully-fledged international convention remains to be seen. In any case, they are 
most likely to provide the basis for future judicial decisions and state practice.208  
 
The law of state responsibility comes into play when a state is in violation 
of its international legal obligations, ie commits an internationally wrongful act. 
When a certain conduct, attributable to a certain state, is in breach of this state’s 
international commitments, this state is under a legal ‘obligation 
 
• (a) [t]o cease that act, if it is continuing;209 
• (b) [t]o offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition (...)’;210 
• (c) and ‘to make full reparation for the injury caused by the [conduct in question]’.211   
 
 Accordingly, when a state is in breach of its international obligations to 
respect and ensure the free and full exercise of internationally recognised human 
rights - whether these are based on international treaties or rooted in customary 
international law - it is legally responsible for this violation and obliged to make 
reparation for the injury caused.   
 
 While this is not the place for a general discussion of content and scope of 
international human rights under customary international law, it must be noted 
that the overwhelming majority of practitioners, scholars and courts agree about 
the customary nature of the most basic human rights, such as the freedom from 
‘(a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) (...) murder or [forced] disappearance 
(...), (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of punishment, (e) 
prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights’.212 Most even regard these rights as being part of the exclusive category of 
peremptory norms and provisions from which no derogation can be permitted.213 
These most fundamental human rights are therefore binding upon all states no 
matter which international conventions they might or might not have ratified. A 
state which, as a matter of state policy, encourages, practises or condones any of 
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these acts is thus in violation of its international obligations and responsible in the 
aforementioned sense.    
 
But towards whom does this responsibility exist? Historically, only states 
were subjects of international law while individuals - with few exceptions in the 
area of humanitarian law - were regarded as objects, not capable of bearing any 
rights or duties.214 This means that even though an individual might have been the 
direct victim of a certain violation or offence,215 it was the victim’s state of 
nationality which was deemed injured under international law. Accordingly, 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts existed only vis-à-vis the injured 
state or states and thus exclusively on an inter state level.216 Article 33 (1) of the 
ILCs Draft Articles codifies this doctrine by stating that   
 
‘[t]he obligations of the responsible State (...) may be owed to another State, to several 
States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and 
content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach’.  
 
However, as can be seen by the inclusion of the phrase ‘or to the 
international community as a whole’, there seems to be a shift towards a broader 
concept of state responsibility. In fact, this phrase reflects recent legal 
developments which were set in motion by the ICJs judgment in the Barcelona 
Traction case.217 Here, the Court ruled that 
 
‘an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of 
diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. (...) [T]hey are 
obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, 
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, and also from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination’.218  
 
What can be deduced from this finding? By introducing the legal concept 
of obligations erga omnes, the Court stressed that some obligations are of such 
paramount importance that their observance is owed to the international 
community as a whole. A violation of such a duty must consequently be 
considered as an offence which affects the international legal order in its entirety 
and not just the directly injured state. Thus, every member of the international 
community - every single state - may have the right and interest to take action 
against the offending state in order to protect the international legal order.219    
 
Van Boven seems to take the matter even further. By stating ‘that the 
obligations resulting from [a state’s] responsibility for breaches of international 
                                                
214
 Bassiouni (note 205) at 212. See also Volker Epping ‘Völkerrechtssubjekte’ in Ipsen (note 109) 
55 at 95. 
215
 For example in cases of violations of customary international norms with regard to the treatment 
of aliens. 
216
 van Boven (note 158) para 42.  
217
 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [1970] ICJ 
Rep 3. 
218
 Ibid at 32.  
219
 See Theodor Meron Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (1989) 191. 
human rights law entail corresponding rights on the part of individual persons (...) 
who are victims of those breaches’,220 he seems to suggest that even individuals 
have the right to invoke the principles of state responsibility in cases of violations 
of their fundamental rights and freedoms. It is now recognised that individual 
persons have at least partial legal capacity in some fields of international law221 
but is this sufficient to confer upon them the right to invoke the international 
responsibility of states without the intermediation of a state on their own account? 
The judgment of the ICJ does not address this question and the ILCs Draft Articles 
are silent on this point. However, article 33 (2), referring to the regulatory content 
of section (1), states that  
 
‘[t]his (...) is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of 
a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State’.  
 
The ILC thus acknowledged the possibility that individual persons or 
entities other than a state might be able to invoke the international responsibility 
of a state, while leaving it open whether and under what circumstances such a 
right exists. It therefore depends on the specific primary obligation - ie the 
violated right or duty - and on state practice and opinio juris ‘whether and to what 
extent persons or entities other than States are entitled to invoke responsibility on 
their own account’.222 The law of state responsibility itself is silent on this matter.  
 
2. State Practice and Opinio Juris 
a. State Practice 
 
While victims’ rights of compensation under various international treaties 
and conventions have been discussed above, it remains to be examined whether 
there is a sufficiently uniform and consistent practice of states to support the 
emergence of such rights under customary international law. As has been 
mentioned above, special attention needs to be paid to the practice of those states 
which have a particular interest in or which are particularly affected by the 
question of financial compensations.223  
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α. Examples of Positive State Practice 
 
Most Southern American states have established some form of mechanism 
for granting compensation to victims of gross human rights abuses. In Argentina, 
Act No. 23,466 grants a non-contributory pension to relatives of persons who 
disappeared during the time of military rule while Act No. 24,411 provides for the 
granting of compensation with regard to persons who died as a result of 
maltreatment by the military or other security forces.224 In Chile, following a 
recommendation of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 
victims recognised by the Commission receive monthly allowances equivalent to 
about 350 US$ to 490 US$ as well as a lump sum compensation equivalent to the 
amount of a yearly allowance.225 Venezuela and Uruguay acknowledge victims’ 
rights to compensation in their respective Constitutions226 while Mexico and 
Paraguay provide compensation through their criminal justice systems.227  
 
 In Asia, India and Sri Lanka are the front-runners in the field of victims’ 
rights. Their respective Supreme Courts have developed a rather impressive 
jurisprudence which enables victims to obtain compensation more easily.228 In 
Bangladesh, South Korea and Japan, compensation for unlawful acts committed 
by public officials can be claimed as a constitutional right.229 China gives victims 
of torture or other grave violations of human rights a right to compensation under 
its 1994 State Compensation Act230 while in Nepal the 1996 Torture 
Compensation Act provides for the compensation of anybody tortured in 
detention.231  
 
In Europe, most legal systems provide for the compensation of victims of 
crime. The decree of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus grants 
victims of political repression in the 1920s - 1980s restitution, compensation and 
other forms of benefits.232 In Sweden, compensation can be claimed for any loss 
of life or personal injury caused by a wrongful act in the course of the exercise of 
public authority under the Tort Liability Act.233 Croatia, Romania, France and 
Greece provide compensation through their criminal justice systems234 while 
Germany compensates victims of Nazi persecution through its Final Federal 
Compensation Law.235 Finally, in Africa, relevant state practice can be found, 
inter alia, in Namibia, Cameroon, Mauritius, Morocco and Uganda. Morocco eg 
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provides for the payment of compensation under its Code of Criminal Procedure 
and its Code of Obligations and Contracts.236 Mauritius allows for compensation 
claims under articles 1382 and 1384 of its Civil Code.237 Cameroon has only 
recently paid compensation to an unlawfully arrested journalist who had been 
tortured in detention,238 while in Uganda, the national Human Rights Commission 
has the authority to order the payment of compensation to victims of human rights 
abuses.239  
 
β. Examples of Negative State Practice 
 
While the aforementioned examples of state practice are encouraging 
developments towards the emergence of a customary obligation to provide victims 
of gross human rights abuses with adequate compensation, it is impossible to 
overlook the wealth of contradictory practice in other parts of the world. Some 
countries like the Ukraine or the Central African Republic do not seem to have 
any compensation laws at all.240 But even where relevant legislature has been put 
in place most laws are either inadequate or insufficiently implemented: in states 
like eg Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Russia or Peru, awards seem to be the exception 
rather than the rule241 whereas Iranian law grants compensation only to persons of 
the Muslim faith.242 Israel appears to be reluctant to pay compensation to certain 
Palestinians243 while Turkey still seems to struggle to fulfil the reparation related 
requirements of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.244  
 
In addition, even some of the positive examples mentioned above have 
their major flaws and shortcomings. The Nepalese Torture Compensation Act has 
been proven rather ineffective and the amounts awarded have been low.245 In 
Belarus, measures of reparation are reserved to victims of political persecution of 
the 1920s - 1980s only, and China’s limited definition of torture restricts the scope 
of application of its State Compensation Act considerably.246 State practice in this 
field of law can therefore only be described as heterogeneous.        
 
b. Opinio Juris 
 
In contrast, opinio juris is rather easy to establish. In pursuance to the 
definition developed above,247 opinio juris can be found, inter alia, in diplomatic 
or political statements, votes in the UN General Assembly or other UN organs, in 
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explanations, statements or votes in other international organisations as well as in 
international treaties and conventions. Given the fact that the four Geneva 
Conventions are now universally accepted and that all of the aforementioned 
universally applicable treaties are ratified by at least three quarters of the 
international community as a whole, one may well argue that states have 
expressed their commitment to provide compensation to victims of serious human 
rights violations on a sufficiently wide scale. The fact that the UN General 
Assembly adopted the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines by consensus is a 
further significant argument in support for this assumption.248  
 
c. Assessment 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from these findings? There is certainly 
sufficient opinio juris in support of the existence of a customary obligation to 
provide victims of gross human rights abuses with financial compensation. But is 
there also a general, uniform and consistent practice of states? It seems, as if there 
is a fairly large discrepancy between national legislation on the one hand and the 
actual practice ie the implementation of these laws on the other. The latter, 
however, must be given greater significance, since it reflects states’ true behaviour 
on the ground more accurately. Hence, given the fact that some states have not 
enacted any compensation laws at all and that existing laws and regulations are 
often insufficiently implemented, state practice is neither general, nor uniform and 
consistent in this field of law. One can thus only draw the conclusion that 
customary international law - at least in its present state - might possibly contain 
an obligation to provide some form of reparation for gross human rights abuses. 
However, it does not oblige states to provide financial compensation to victims of 
gross human rights violations.  
 
E. South Africa’s Compliance with International Legal Obligations 
 
After having examined the state of international law with regard to the 
questions of prosecution and compensation, it remains to be seen whether the 
South African transitional process was in compliance with the country’s 
international legal obligations. Given the importance and significance of the 
transitional process of South Africa in general and the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation  Commission  in  particular  as  a  potential  model  for  transitional  
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processes and truth commissions in other transitional contexts, this is not only 
important with regard to South Africa itself but also with regard to the question, 
whether the South African transitional model might be ‘exported’ and lawfully 
employed in other parts of the world.   
 
I. Customary International Law 
 
As has been shown, customary law in its present state does not contain any 
legal obligations with regard to the matters of prosecution or compensation for 
serious violations of human rights. While such obligations might now be well in 
the process of emergence, they certainly did not exist in the second half of the 
1990s when South Africa had to decide upon how to deal with its burdensome 
past. No violation can therefore be established with regard to South Africa’s duties 
and obligations under customary international law.  
 
II. International Treaties 
 
Somehow more complex is the legal situation with regard to the 
international treaties and conventions South Africa has ratified. Although the four 
Geneva Conventions were the only relevant international treaties which were 
binding upon South Africa under the Apartheid rule, at least some of the other 
aforementioned international conventions might be of significance too, since they 
were all signed, ratified or acceded to during the period of transition. 
 
1. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
 As has been said, the four Geneva Conventions were the only relevant 
international treaties binding upon South Africa during the Apartheid rule. This 
might have been the reason why they were also the only international norms and 
provisions249 which were examined more closely by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, in its ruling on the constitutionality of section 20 (7) of the 
PNURA.250 Although this judgement - from the perspective of international law - 
was rather disappointing, it was correct in its assessment that ‘it is doubtful 
whether the Geneva Conventions (...) apply at all to the situation in which this 
country found itself during the years of the conflict [of the past]’.251 
 
 In order to find an answer to this question, one needs to differentiate 
between the South African internal conflict on the one and the various cross-
border activities of the South African security forces on the other side. While the 
applicability of international humanitarian law in relation to the former might be 
disputable, there can be little doubt that with regard to the latter, the Geneva 
Conventions were fully applicable. Although South Africa never declared war 
against its front-line states,252 its invasion into Angola and its military activities in 
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Mozambique and Namibia do clearly qualify as international armed conflicts in 
accordance with the Conventions common article 2.253 Thus, acts like the attack 
on the Kassinga refugee camp in Angola where the use of fragmentation bombs 
killed and maimed indiscriminately,254 and other crimes which might be subsumed 
under the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions255 had to be 
investigated, prosecuted and punished. Hence, section 20 (7) PNURA clearly 
violates South Africa’s legal obligations under international humanitarian law.  
 
 In contrast, with regard to the internal confrontation inside South Africa’s 
borders, the situation is far more ambiguous. The decisive question is here, 
whether this conflict can rightfully be considered as a non-international armed 
conflict in the sense of the Conventions common article 3. While the Geneva 
Conventions do not provide for a positive definition of the term ‘non-international 
armed conflict’, article 1 (2) Additional Protocol II provides for a negative 
delimitation by stating that ‘[t]his Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts’.   
 
 The question is now, whether the situation in South Africa should either be 
considered as a non-international armed conflict or whether it should be subsumed 
under the definition of article 1 (2) Additional Protocol II. In the early days of the 
struggle, the situation was largely characterised by demonstrations, passive 
resistance and sporadic acts of violence, which did not reach the threshold of 
violence of article 1 (2) Additional Protocol II. However, at the latest after the 
declaration of the state of emergency in 1985, the situation became more violent 
and chaotic and appeared to increasingly move towards a fully-fledged military 
confrontation.256 The South African national government considered itself to be at 
war and the country to be subjected to a ‘total onslaught’, which had to be 
countered by decisive anti-revolutionary warfare.257 Therefore, at least after the 
declaration of the state of emergency, South Africa’s internal strife resembled 
largely a non-international armed conflict in the sense of the Conventions’ 
common article 3. Accordingly, South Africa was under a legal obligation to 
prosecute and punish any violation of the prohibitions of the Conventions’ 
common article 3 committed during the state of emergency from 1985 to 1990.258 
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Thus, section 20 (7) PNURA is also in violation of South Africa’s international 
legal obligations in relation to its conflict at home. 
 
2. Non-Retroactivity of International Treaties 
 
 Like any juridical norm, international treaties cannot apply retroactively.259 
Article 28 VCLT states clearly that ‘[u]nless a different intention appears from the 
treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to 
any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the 
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party’. Since none of 
the previously examined international treaties and conventions - with the 
exception of the four Geneva Conventions - applied to South Africa during the 
Apartheid rule, no rights or obligations may be derived form them directly in 
respect of any act or omission committed during this period. 
 
   Yet, subsequent to South Africa’s ratification or accession,260 these 
treaties’ rights and obligations as determined supra became binding upon South 
Africa from this time on. It is therefore a question of the respective conventions’ 
applicability ratione temporis whether the duty to prosecute serious violations of 
human rights only applies to those crimes committed after the date of South 
Africa’s ratification or accession261 or also to acts or offences committed prior to 
this date.262 
 
 On the one hand one could argue that the conventional obligations to 
prevent the occurrence of torture, murder or other gross violations of human rights 
must be separated from the conventional obligation to prosecute and punish such 
acts. States’ failure to comply with the latter constitutes a violation of international 
law in itself, even though the original crime might have been committed prior to 
the respective conventions’ entry into force.263 According to this view, South 
Africa was and is still under a legal obligation to prosecute and punish even those 
crimes and offences committed prior to the critical date, ie crimes and offences 
committed under Apartheid rule.     
 
However, this stand would lead to the somewhat awkward result that a 
state could be obliged by international treaties or conventions to investigate and 
prosecute gross violations of human rights which might have been committed 
decades before these conventions’ entry into force. Yet, even if the acts in 
question might have constituted international crimes under customary 
international law, the obligation to prosecute cannot be derived from custom but 
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only from treaty-based international law.264 However, the wording of the different 
international treaties does not allow for their retroactive applicability. Article 2 (3) 
(a) ICCPR eg can only be invoked in conjunction with other articles of the 
Covenant and implies that an effective remedy must only be provided subsequent 
to a violation of one of the Covenant’s rights.265 Yet, when the acts which could 
have constituted such violations occurred prior to the date of the Covenant’s entry 
into force, they might have been in violation of other international norms but not 
of one of the Covenant’s rights and freedoms. Similar considerations apply to the 
other international treaties mentioned above and the Human Rights Committee266 
as well as the Committee against Torture267 have confirmed this view in several of 
their findings.  
 
Thus, due to their inapplicability ratione temporis, apart from the Geneva 
Conventions, none of the aforementioned international treaties and conventions 
imposes any legal obligations upon South Africa with regard to any act or 
omission committed prior to their ratification or accession by the South African 
state. 
3. Article 18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
Although a state may express its consent to be bound by a treaty by 
signature,268 most multilateral treaties require a formal act of ratification for their 
entry into force. However, this does not mean that signing an international treaty is 
meaningless. In contrast, article 18 VCLT obliges states ‘to refrain from acts 
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when (...) it has signed the 
treaty (...) until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the 
treaty’. This obligation does now appear to be generally accepted.269 
 
South Africa signed the Convention against Torture on 29 January 1993 
and the ICCPR on 3 October 1994 but ratified both treaties only on 10 December 
1998. In the meantime, however, it became legally obliged not to frustrate the 
object and purpose of these two international conventions. Yet, the granting of 
amnesty for serious human rights violators and the yearlong reluctance to pay any 
compensation to their victims seems to stand in flat contradiction to the 
Conventions’ rights and obligations.270 It thus appears that South Africa’s 
compensation and prosecution policies ‘defeated’ the object and purpose of these 
two international treaties. 
 
However, it must be noted that the object or purpose of a given 
international convention can only be ‘defeated’ by those acts or omissions which 
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would have constituted a violation of the said convention if committed subsequent 
to the convention’s entry into force. Otherwise, one would have the peculiar result 
that a certain act or omission could be in violation of a state’s international legal 
obligations prior to the ratification of a given international treaty, although the 
same conduct would have been legal if committed after the treaty’s entry into 
force. Yet, signing an international treaty is nothing more than a preliminary stage 
which cannot entail more far-reaching international obligations than the act of 
ratification itself. Hence, nothing which would be in compliance with the norms 
and provisions of a given international convention subsequent to its entry into 
force can possibly ‘defeat’ the object or purpose of the same convention prior to 
this date. Accordingly, since South Africa’s prosecution and compensation 
policies did not violate its international legal obligations subsequent to the above 
mentioned international treaties’ entry into force,271 they could not ‘defeat’ the 
object and purpose of these conventions either. Hence, no violation of article 18 
VCLT can therefore be established.   
 
F. Conclusion 
 
The South African TRC contributed significantly to South Africa’s 
comparatively peaceful and successful transition into democracy. Giving victims a 
forum to tell their stories and granting amnesty to the perpetrators of the conflict 
of the past, was South Africa’s unique way of trying to restore national unity, to 
dispense justice and to promote trust and reconciliation between its different racial 
communities. Despite its flaws and shortcomings, which are inevitable for a 
process of this dimension, South Africa’s transitional process was a story of 
success and achievement, which is rightfully regarded as an encouraging and 
positive example for transitional societies in other parts of the world. 
 
Yet, from an international legal point of view, it can only receive mixed 
assessments: 
 
 With regard to the issue of providing financial compensation to the victims 
of serious violations of human rights, South Africa did not infringe its 
international legal obligations: primarily because neither customary nor 
conventional international law imposed such obligations upon the South African 
state. Secondarily, even if there had been such an obligation, financial 
compensation to victims was eventually provided - despite it being too little, too 
late. 
 However, the granting of amnesty, for serious violations of the Geneva 
Convention’s common article 3 and for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
committed in the context of South Africa’s international armed conflicts in 
Angola, Namibia or Mozambique, was not in compliance with the country’s 
international legal obligations. In so far, South Africa’s transitional process must 
be criticised. 
 
 Although this is the only point where an infringement of international law 
could be established, one must bear in mind that South Africa’s situation under 
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international law during the time of Apartheid was rather unique. Today, there is 
probably not a single state which has not ratified at least one of the 
aforementioned universally or regionally applicable treaties containing further 
obligations with regard to the issues of prosecution or compensation for serious 
human rights violations. This must be kept in mind when ‘exporting’ the South 
African model to other transitional societies.  
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